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The original objective of examining the foundations of overriding
government interests' was to cut through the interpretive morass and
reveal two truths. First, the balance between rights and interests
needs to be radically restructured, regardless of which interpretive
theory one employs. Second, partiality exists at the core of the consti-
tutional theory of those who most loudly claim neutrality, and yet who
refuse to bring rights and interests into an appropriate relationship.2
* Professor, Albany Law School. LL.B. 1965, Yale Law School; B.A. 1962,
Princeton University. The author owes debts for helpful comments and suggestions to C.
Edwin Baker, William Cohen, Sally Friedman, William E. Nelson, Byron A. Nichols, Theo-
dore J. Stein, participants at a works-in-progress seminar at the 1993 AALS Constitutional
Law Conference, participants at the Hastings Law Journal Symposium, and particularly to
David Faigman and Vincent Bonventre, who discussed the project at length with me and
took the trouble to give a close reading to a draft of this Aiticle. I also want to express my
appreciation for the work of my research assistant, Krishna K. Singh.
1. See Stephen E. Gottlieb, Compelling Governmental Interests: An Essential but
Unanalyzed Term in Constitutional Adjudication, 68 B.U. L. REv. 917 (1988) [hereinafter
Gottlieb, Compelling Governmental Interests]; see also PUBLIC VALUES IN CONSTrrU-
TIONAL LAW (Stephen E. Gottlieb ed., 1993) [hereinafter PUBLIc VALuE.S IN CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAw]. The Court has used the concept of public or "government" interests,
sometimes described as "compelling," to express social values which, in the Court's view,
justify constricting "private" rights. This Article argues in part that the Court's view of
interests is tragically incomplete.
2. On claims of neutrality, see Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2874
(1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (adhering to text ("[Tihe Constitution says absolutely nothing
about it.") rather than judges' preferences); William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living
Constitution, 54 Tax. L..REv. 693, 699 (1976) (arguing that individual preferences are not
to circumvent, via the judiciary, the United States system of representative government);
Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. Rav. 849, 854, 863-64 (1989)
(excluding political preferences via originalism) [hereinafter Scalia, Originalism]; Antonin
Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1175,1179 (1989) (excluding
political preferences via rules) [hereinafter Scalia, Rule of Law]. For an attack on the
concept of neutrality, see Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudica-
tion, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976). Attacks on the neutrality of doctrine are a dominant
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Since my original article appeared, 3 the notion of balancing rights
and interests has come under increasing criticism and declining ex-
plicit judicial use.4 These developments appear to take the bite out of
the original analysis, and frustrate attempts to focus attention on con-
stitutional values, of which interests are one form of articulation, and
on their implications.5
In contrast to these developments, there now seems to be a trend
toward increasing scholarly interest in balancing and in what are vari-
ously called overriding public values or compelling interests.6 And it
remains true-despite criticism and declining explicit judicial balanc-
ing-that interests play an immense, though often unarticulated, role
in constitutional analysis. Interests are allowed to enter and dominate
constitutional law without being subjected to the scrutiny that claims
of right are.7 Such a role for interests is generally unacknowledged in
part because it appears to be inconsistent with many theories of con-
stitutional law. Yet, in a variety of different vocabularies, interests
find their way into virtually every theory of constitutional law. The
failure to identify their presence only serves to protect their power.
Moreover, the contest between interests and rights is not "neutral"
and produces perverse results.
These concerns with the role that interests (or "public values" or
"government interests") and balancing play within the reality, though
theme in critical legal studies. See Mark G. Kelman, Trashing, 36 STAN. L. REV. 293, 293-
94 (1984). Each of those positions makes it important to identify the fundamental assump-
tions of constitutional law and theory.
3. See Gottlieb, Compelling Governmental Interests, supra note 1.
4. See Stephen E. Gottlieb, Overriding Public Values, in PUBLIC VALUES IN CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW, supra note 1, at 2-4 [hereinafter Gottlieb, Overriding Public Values].
5. For an extended discussion of the implications of judicial language and a call for
more direct communication, see ROBERT F. NAGEL, CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURES: THE
MENTALITY AND CONSEQUENCES OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 104-05, 121-55 (1989).
6. See Louis Henkin, Infallibility Under Law: Constitutional Balancing, 78 COLUM.
L. REV. 1022, 1046-49 (1978) (calling for an examination of interests); Richard H. Fallon,
Jr., Individual Rights and the Powers of Government, 27 GA. L. REv. 343, 344-45, 360-61
(1993) (maintaining that balancing is embedded in our constitutional language). In view of
our similar conclusions, the differences between my own and Fallon's very interesting argu-
ment about the relationship of rights and interests requires a bit of clarification. My argu-
ment is, in part, the reverse of Fallon's; in a functional jurisprudence, rights and interests
are not necessarily defined by the constraints imposed by conflicts between them. That-
in fact, though not in theory-is what happens in a formal jurisprudence. On the other
hand, the interests and the rights we actually subscribe to instantiate the same underlying
values. Finally, I believe my argument is somewhat more general. Accepting balancing as
undefinable, I need not restrict my discussion of interests to a specific legal theory. Rather,
my argument is premised on consistent applications of a variety of legal theories.
7. Fallon, supra note 6, at 347-60; see also Gottlieb, Compelling Governmental Inter-
ests, supra note 1, at 925-37.
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not necessarily the rhetoric, of constitutional analysis are reflected in
several related propositions, each of which is considered below.
First, many arguments about interpretation are logically irrelevant.
An extensive literature has developed analyzing which theory of inter-
pretation is preferable and whether any theory is sufficiently definite
to provide answers.8 To the extent that these theories of interpreta-
tion are defined sufficiently to guide legal conclusions, an evenhanded
application of them to interests, as well as to rights, would result in
similar outcomes-cancelling many of the apparent differences in the
outcomes of those theories. And yet, despite the potential for similar
outcomes, those same theories continue to have a powerful impact on
what gets scrutinized and assumed, and, as a result, how cases get
decided.
Second, many arguments about balancing are irrelevant. The
open texture or indeterminacy of balancing is illegitimate from posi-
tivist and liberal perspectives because balancing appears political.
Open texture is assumed by realist and critical scholarship that treats
all law as political. In the end, however, the choices actually available
have little to do with decision-making procedure or whether balancing
is too imprecise. Like the arguments about interpretation, the argu-
ments about balancing are significant primarily as arguments about
what gets scrutinized and what gets assumed without examination.
The useful question is not psychological or procedural, but political
and jurisprudential. The useful question asks: What "improves" the
results?
Third, interests define values. Half a century ago, Roscoe Pound
espoused the use of the term "interests" to focus attention on consti-
tutional values. 9 Today, constitutional values are a major area of
scholarly debate. Interests, however, have been largely excluded from
this discussion because of their judicial treatment. Values are crucial
in constitutional law, yet courts and commentators have failed to ex-
plore the implications of a large body of the values that constitutional
law protects. In fact, interests have a strongly "republican" and com-
munitarian cast that, when applied to rights, expand liberties as much
as they shape them.
This Article explores the way many reigning theories of constitu-
tional interpretation have systematically excluded important and logi-
8. See infra Parts II-IIl.B.
9. See Roscoe Pound, A Survey of Social Interests, 57 HARV. L. REv. 1, 3-4, 16-17
(1943) [hereinafter Pound, Survey]; Roscoe Pound, The Theory of Judicial Decision, 36
HARV. L. REv. 641, 654-58, 660-62 (1923) [hereinafter Pound, Judicial Decision].
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cally inescapable matters from constitutional discourse. Part I
analyzes the role of values in the recent Supreme Court case Herrera
v. Collins.'0 Parts II, III, and IV generalize the discussion by analyz-
ing the structure of decision making. More specifically, Part II ex-
plores how the analysis of interests leads the implications of
interpretive modes to converge, Part III explores the virtually ines-
capable role of interests, and Part IV explores the bias in the way
interests have been used.
However, before we really get started, several caveats are in or-
der. Historically, interests have been used to attack rights and hence
threaten much constitutional theorizing." Thus, one important view
is that constitutional analysis should focus on developing the meaning
of constitutional provisions, not on explaining them away. Those sub-
scribing to this view treat interests as improper detractors from consti-
tutional law.12 Given the historic misuse of the concept of public
interests, there is much to be said for that position. Indeed, despite a
difference in analysis, my goals are similar. I am not trying to elevate
interests; rather, I am trying to tame them. The United States
Supreme Court does not tame interests when it stops writing about
them; it merely hides them, making them even more powerful be-
cause, as hidden, they are not subject to scrutiny.
Similarly, I do not seek to sustain a separate identity for interests
apart from rights; instead, interests which do not defend constitutional
rights are illegitimate. I do not argue that interests should be bal-
anced against rights in any specific fashion; instead, I argue that the
balancing takes place whether we will it or not, with very important
consequences. Although I argue that the deep structure of interests
and rights is a common set of values, David Faigman's work certainly
makes it clear that it matters how we describe the implementation of
those values (i.e., as interests or rights), and how we reconcile the
two.
13
That leads to a final caveat. Interests can be weighed at many
different "levels" of analysis and of generality. They tend to be de-
scribed differently at each level.14 Some considerations may differ if
we are asking about judicial role (which generates arguments about
10. 113 S. Ct. 853 (1993).
11. See supra note 6.
12. Richard Pildes and C. Edwin Baker offer such theories in this Symposium.
13. See generally David L. Faigman, Madisonian Balancing: A Theory of Constitu-
tional Adjudication, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 641 (1994).
14. See CRAIG R. DUCAT, MODES OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 181-83
(1978); Pound, Survey, supra note 9, at 3.
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whether we should "balance" or try to do something else) or about
substantive justice (which generates arguments about specific out-
comes). To focus on a single such level of analysis, however, risks
obscuring common features and considerations. Analytically, the
same considerations may affect the development of a rule, the inter-
pretation of language, or the balance of justice in a single case.
This Article focuses on the common elements. It is an attempt to
get beyond method and back to values because values are what the
Constitution is about. An important step toward that end is to scruti-
nize interests under a microscope.
I. Herrera v. Collins' 5
Leonel Herrera was executed while this Article was being
drafted. Herrera may have been guilty of two murders, as a majority
of the United States Supreme Court apparently believed. 16 But no
court held or required that Herrera have a hearing on evidence that
had become available years after his trial and conviction.17 Although
the Court left a small window open for reconsideration in a more
egregious case,' 8 the majority wrote that executing a duly convicted
person despite newly discovered evidence of innocence is constitu-
tional so long as the appropriate procedures were used to convict him.
These "appropriate procedures" did not make room for a hearing on
newly discovered evidence of innocence. 19
Despite the recent academic debates, Herrera's execution did not
depend on the Court's choice of interpretive modes, preferences for
rules, or hostility to balancing. Rather, Herrera's fate was sealed by
the values that did, and did not, seem important to the justices. Inter-
ests play a critical but minimally examined role in such value clashes.
The Court followed a doctrinal path toward what it treated as
dispositive rules: "Claims of actual innocence based on newly discov-
ered evidence have never been held to state a ground for federal
habeas relief absent an independent constitutional violatioi occurring
in the underlying state criminal proceeding. '20 Herrera was not un-
derstood by the Court to claim a procedural error. The Court did not
15. 113 S. Ct. 853 (1993).
16. Id. at 870.
17. Id. at 873 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Texas barred motions for a new trial on
newly discovered evidence made more than 60 days after judgment. Id. at 864.
18. Id. at 869-70.
19. Id. at 860-63.
20. Id. at 860.
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interpret the Constitution to include any procedural requirement that
a court consider newly discovered evidence of innocence.
But doctrine is hardly a straightjacket, especially for so novel a
claim. The dissent easily identified other lines of cases stressing the
cruelty of needless punishment l and the Due Process Clause require-
ment of freedom from arbitrary and purposeless restraint.22
Five members of the Court joined Chief Justice Rehnquist's opin-
ion, and Justice White concurred in the result. Of the five in the ma-
jority, Justices O'Connor and Kennedy made it clear in a concurrence
that the constitutionally required response to a substantial claim of
innocence was not settled for them.23 In dissent, Justices Blackmun,
Stevens, and Souter concluded that an appropriate claim would raise
constitutional requirements. 24 By contrast, Justices Scalia and
Thomas, the remaining members of the majority, denied any possibil-
ity of a constitutional requirement to consider evidence discovered af-
ter trial:
There is no basis in text, tradition, or even in contemporary practice
(if that were enough), for finding in the Constitution a right to de-
mand judicial consideration of newly discovered evidence of inno-
cence brought forward after conviction.25
Despite the conclusiveness of Scalia's language, his preference for a
textual interpretation does not have such clear results. The language
of the due process and cruel and unusual punishment provisions could
be interpreted as requiring judgment among competing considera-
tions. If that is so, then textual interpretation might have to be ap-
plied to "public" interests as well as "private" rights. What in the text
of the Constitution makes the finality of a conviction preeminent? If
such finality is to be inferred from the efficiency of government, then
the nature of efficient government might be inferred from the Pream-
ble: "to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic
Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general
Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty. ' 26 Neither the Pream-
ble, with its emphasis on justice, welfare, and liberty, nor any other
constitutional text supports the inference that an innocent life may be
21. Id. at 876-77 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
22. Id. at 879 (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2805 (1992)
(quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting from dismissal on
jurisdictional grounds))).
23. Id. at 871, 874 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
24. Id. at 876-79 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
25. Id. at 874-75 (Scalia, J., concurring).
26. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
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extinguished in order to save the time of a hearing. If the text can be
interpreted with the liberality required to infer a strong public interest
in finality, that same liberality supports even more strongly a right to a
hearing on newly discovered evidence. Similarly, a narrower textual-
ism that leads us toward narrower inferences about Herrera's rights
would, by parallel logic, call into question the inferences that led to
the value of finality.
Scalia, of course, tries to avoid the indeterminacy of language by
confining it to tradition or contemporary practice.27 However, that
approach itself is not implied by the language of the Constitution, but
by Scalia's concern for constraints on judgment. Yet, similar questions
can be raised about those interests or values. If the inference of a
strong public interest in finality is proper, why not also an inference
about accomplishing substantial justice? Put in that way, the outcome
for Herrera would have been far more questionable than Scalia's neat
categorization.
Despite its rule-driven language, the majority opinion in fact sug-
gests an intuitive balance, favoring a public interest in finality over
federal habeas review, as the foundation of its denial of relief: "Few
rulings would be more disruptive of our federal system than to pro-
vide for federal habeas review of free-standing claims of actual inno-
cence." 28 Referring to the years since Herrera's trial and conviction,
the Court added that "the passage of time only diminishes the reliabil-
ity of criminal adjudications. '' 29 A full discussion of the alternatives
would make it clear that a flat rule of finality does not follow from the
need for reliability as if by logical necessity.30 But the Court's intui-
tive balance favoring finality was essential to its conclusion. Without
that value, it is unclear why Herrera's claim did not amount to a post-
conviction procedural violation of the due process and cruelty provi-
sions of the Constitution. Neither doctrine nor rule-driven categoriza-
tion suffices to produce a convincing result.
The Herrera decision looks like a rule. But the Court's discussion
of finality made sufficiently clear its resort to balancing. Indeed, that
would have been almost inescapable. The Court treated Herrera's
motion for a hearing to consider newly discovered evidence as a re-
27. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2874 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989) (Scalia, J.).
28. Herrera, 113 S. Ct. at 861.
29. Id. at 862. An alternative explanation is a judicial disinterest in the fate of
prisoners.
30. Compare the Court's pithy but brusque discussion, id. at 862.
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quest to review nonconstitutional error. It wrote as if this were a cate-
gorical decision. But what category should Herrera's claim be placed
in, and how, operationally and empirically, should it be handled?
Herrera's motion easily could have been treated as raising an issue of
fundamental fairness under the Due Process Clause. The question of
what process Herrera was due cannot be clearly separated-mentally,
logically, or on the basis of precedent-from the question whether
such a hearing, or the right to it, is important to the accuracy of the
result.3' If those questions are inseparable, the categorization is a bal-
ancing act in masquerade.
There is no yardstick that allows the Court to evaluate the impor-
tance of Herrera's life, multiply it by the likelihood of preventing a
miscarriage of justice, and then compare that with the costs of the
hearing in terms of time and money.32 Quantification of such values
as life and justice would be crude at best and would surely omit many
important factors.33 The judgment cannot be a mathematical conclu-
sion; it is necessarily something of an ordering or a feeling. The judg-
ment is not a balance in any sense that can be defined in order to
replicate it procedurally and substantively. Surely, other people might
reach similar results given similar information. There are cultural pat-
terns that lead people to common conclusions.34 But there is no com-
puterizable formula.35 The decision is based on the importance of the
decision to constitutional values, but the process is undefined. Thus, it
is unclear what is to be gained by describing the process as balancing.
However, something certainly is gained by specifying a process
that includes information affecting the judgments people make. If cat-
egorization is defined to exclude the likelihoods of judicial error (i.e.,
31. See Graham v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 892, 903 (1993) (describing the scope of collat-
eral review as a function of the "'concept of ordered liberty,"' which includes procedures
necessary to ensure the accuracy of criminal proceedings) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut,
302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)); Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 232-34 (1978) (recognizing that
jury size is a function of its accuracy).
32. On the value of life, see GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBITT, TRAGIC CHOICES
136-38 (1978).
33. See Laurence H. Tribe, Seven Deadly Sins of Straining the Constitution Through a
Pseudo-Scientific Sieve, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 155 (1984).
34. See LUDWIG WITITGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS §§ 197-99, 201-02,
206-09, 217, 219, 242 (G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 3d ed. 1968); see also KLAUS KRIP-
PENDORFF, CONTENT ANALYSIS: AN INTRODUCTION TO ITS METHODOLOGY 130-31, 133
(1980) (explaining that content analysis requires that the different people employed to
categorize must identify categories consistently, a standard known as reliability); ROBERT
PHILIP WEBER, BASIC CONTENT ANALYSIS (Sage University Paper Series on Quantitative
Applications in the Social Sciences, Series No. 07-049) (2d ed. 1990) (same).
35. See BART KoSKo, Fuzzy THINKING: THE NEW SCIENCE OF Fuzzy LOGIC (1993).
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the possibility that the courts in Texas convicted an innocent man) and
if balancing is defined to include the possibility of such error, then the
choice between them matters. Ultimately what matters is not what we
call or label the pro~ess of decision, but what is included and whether
formulas, however imprecise, are specified for taking account of the
competing values (e.g., the burden of proof36-analytically a "feel" or
a "balance" or a "categorization," but one that orders the values).
Interests mattered a great deal to Herrera. If finality is the ulti-
mate consideration, Herrera had to die-no doubt content in the
knowledge that he was serving society by laying down his life. But if
finality is a consideration because it serves the broader purposes of
government, then the importance of finality must wax and wane with
different circumstances. Furthermore, if the purposes of government
include justice, welfare, and liberty, then the finality of a death sen-
tence in the face of newly discovered evidence must rank quite low
among considerations that serve the broader purposes of government.
Our handling of interests reveals how we define values. If inter-
ests are accepted at face value to trump rights, then both categoriza-
tion and balancing mask a rigged game. For example, if the
government interest in finality trumps the right to liberty, then it is
irrelevant to explore whether significant costs would be imposed by a
less strict rule. If, however, interests are analyzed in terms of the con-
stitutional values they defend, they are more easily subordinated
when their relationship to those values is tenuous, and more easily
compared in magnitude to opposing values described as rights.
II. The Irrelevance of Interpretation
Modes of interpretation have far less relation to outcomes than
the heated arguments about them would suggest. If properly applied,
the results of conflicting modes of interpretation should converge.
Some of that convergence may be pure happenstance. Some may be
the result of common starting points in constitutional provisions. But
there are further structural reasons why modes of interpretation,
properly carried out, converge. Aspects of the common, implicit,
deep evaluative structure will be addressed in Part III. This Part ex-
plores the logically convergent results of many conflicting theories.
As I have explained elsewhere, 37 while the pedigree of asserted
rights has been carefully screened in accord with reigning theories of
36. See Faigman, supra note 13.
37. See Gottlieb, Compelling Governmental Interests, supra note 1, at 917.
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interpretation before they could be applied to controversies before
the courts, interests have floated into opinions with little analytical
rigor. If courts applied various theories of interpretation to interests
in the same manner they do to rights, the results would potentially be
very significant. Interests after all have been used to constrict rights,
as finality limited, indeed terminated, Leonel Herrera's rights, or as
claims of national security have been used to limit rights to speak.38 If
interests are less expansive, the scope of protected rights may ex-
pand.39 Thus, the preliminary question is whether the different inter-
pretive canons affect the balance between rights and interests
differently.
On a philosophical level, there should be a considerable differ-
ence among modes of interpretation. The paths of text, history, in-
tent, results, or various versions of entitlement theory appear to
diverge sharply. When one chooses an interpretive method and enters
the analytical tunnel, she loses sight of the other cars. One would ex-
pect that if she arrives at the same destination as the other cars it
would be by chance, subject only to the constraints placed by the rela-
tion of each path to some singular constitutional starting point.
However, if the same interpretive canon is used for interests and
rights, the results should converge. Textualists will (or should) balk at
the "unwritten" character of many interests, or definitions of interests,
as well as rights. The employment of nontextual interests is clearest
when the language implies judgment, and therefore implies the rele-
vance of interests. The textualist should also balk when the need for
judgment is real, but implicit and unacknowledged. And the textualist
should balk at interpretive canons that apparently exclude the need
for judgment, but are themselves based on just such judgments.
Naturalists will (or should) find both interests and rights expan-
sive. This is particularly so to the extent that interests are in defense
of rights, as are interests in life, health, safety, etc. Joshua DeShaney4°
and Deborah Kircher4t asserted as rights what would elsewhere have
been treated as interests (i.e., rights to the effective administration of
the laws and police protection). 42
38. See, e.g., Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 125-34 (1959); Fallon, supra
note 6.
39. See Fallon, supra note 6, at 360-61.
40. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
41. See Kircher v. City of Jamestown, 543 N.E.2d 443 (N.Y. 1989).
42. See also Kate Stith, The Government Interest in Criminal Law: Whose Interest Is
It, Anyway?, in PUBLIC VALUES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 1, at 135.
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Any consistent interpretive canon will treat rights and interests in
the same way. The result is that the difference in outcomes of differ-
ent interpretive canons will tend to cancel out as each moves toward a
similar equilibrium of rights and interests.4 3
Further, on a practical level many modes of interpretation blend
into one another because the ambiguities in the chains of reasoning
tend to be filled culturally or intuitively. Instinctively we read philos-
ophy into history and culture into philosophy. Courts explore diverse
notions of "rights" to and "interests" in life, liberty, property, equal-
ity, and democracy both explicitly and instinctively. Indeed, the cul-
ture that forms the inarticulate basis for many of our judgments
cannot be uniquely described at any moment. Like precedent, the cul-
ture not only reflects what has been, but its meaning for us is already
beginning to react to what will be, further expanding the reservoir of
interpretation.
Historical interpretation is so bedeviled with questions of prior
context and translation to contemporary problems that it is virtually
impossible to interpret historical actors without assuming that they
would think like ourselves. 44 "Representation-reinforcement" as
urged by John Ely,45 and its original "preferred freedoms" model,46
are sufficiently open-textured with respect to crucial definitions that
they are unable to exclude contemporary values on the critical ques-
tion of what categories are permissible.47 Extra-textual interpreta-
tions invite large choices at their inception.48 And textualists cannot
claim linguistic clarity in the important cases.49 Each major approach
43. See Gottlieb, Compelling Governmental Interests, supra note 1, at 966-69; Got-
tlieb, Overriding Public Values, supra note 4, at 10-13.
44. See Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L.
Rnv. 204, 208 (1980); H. Jefferson Powell, Rules for Originalists, 73 VA. L. REv. 659, 672-
75, 684-87 (1987).
45. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DisTRusT. A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
87-103 (1980).
46. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938); see also
ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, THE SUPREME COURT. PALLADIUM OF FREEDOM 149-78
(1962).
47. See Mark Tushnet, Darkness on the Edge of Town: The Contributions of John
Hart Ely to Constitutional Theory, 89 YALE L.J. 1037, 1045-57 (1980).
48. Compare MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THS COURTS AND HUMAN
RIGHTS: AN INQUIRY INTO THE LEGITIMACY OF CONSTITUTIONAL POLICY MAKING BY
THE JUDICIARY (1982) (arguing a noninterpretivist position) with ELY, supra note 45, at
43-72 (arguing the fallacy of noninterpretivist rights).
49. Compare Scalia, Originalism, supra note 2 and Scalia, Rule of Law, supra note 2
(describing textualism as limiting discretion) with PHILIP BOBBrT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE:
THEORY OF THE CONSTrrtUON 25-38 (1982) (describing textualism as fundamentally
ambiguous).
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to constitutional decision making necessarily incorporates implicit
prejudices under the rubric of a more sharply defined method empha-
sizing something else. These openings tend to make interpretive
modes less important and values more so.
Frederick Schauer is of course correct that some provisions are
not open to doubt in some contexts, and do not invite a breadth of
ambiguous considerations.50 But all considerations are implicitly, if
not explicitly, resolved-they either do or do not belong.51 Where
and to the extent that the texture is open, values enter. Indeed,
whether the texture is open is itself a judgment based in part on values
held by the interpreter.
The question then is whether courts should articulate as many of
the factors as possible which enter into their decisions or suppress
some considerations in favor of intellectual shortcuts. In other words,
is there an advantage to accepting at face value implicit and unarticu-
lated (cultural or idiosyncratic) shorthand conclusions, or should the
implications be teased out and subjected to analysis? 52 There is, as
Kathleen Sullivan has shown, a practical difference in the way that
balancing and categorization work out.53 Since most, or perhaps even
all, considerations are at least implicitly present, the difference be-
tween balancing and categorization has to do with which values are
made explicit and which are left as unarticulated judgments.5 4
To argue that interpretive modes are identical would be a mis-
take; I am not making that argument. Rather, I am arguing that they
tend to converge and resemble each other more to the extent that
50. FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING By THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINA-
TION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 207-28 (1991).
51. Compare Hohfeld's insight that the legal order is complete. See Wesley Newcomb
Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE LJ.
710 (1917) [hereinafter Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions]; Wesley Newcomb
Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE
L.J. 16 (1913) [hereinafter Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions]; see also the
analysis of Hohfeld in James L. Kainen, Nineteenth Century Interpretations of the Federal
Contract Clause: The Transformation From Vested to Substantive Rights Against the State,
31 BUFF. L. REV. 381, 437-45 (1982).
52. Implicit in that judgment is a theory of constitutional law. See Paul W. Kahn, The
Court, the Community and the Judicial Balance: The Jurisprudence of Justice Powell, 97
YALE L.J. 1, 4-5, 47-59 (1987).
53. See Kathleen Sullivan, Categorization, Balancing, and Government Interests, in
PUBLIC VALUES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 1, at 241; see also SCHAUER, supra
note 50, at 77-78, 136-37, 191-96.
54. Using the Herrera case as an example, the difference is whether the Court is going
to balance the interest in finality against process rights, or simply say no right exists, and in
saying that condense the balance into a value judgment that a right does or does not exist.
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implicit factors are teased out. The ultimate differences in outcome
among interpretive approaches is not simply the result of different
philosophical, cultural, and historical methods, but, to a large extent,
the result of reflective and unreflective methods. That conclusion is
reinforced by the debate over balancing, discussed in Part III.
MI. The Irrelevance of Balancing
There is an extensive literature about whether balancing or cate-
gorization is preferable.5 5 There are important distinctions between
ad hoe balancing for each individual case and balancing to derive
rules.5 6 There are also important common features. Both involve a
"weighing" or "judgment" among conflicting values, and most of the
arguments apply to both, albeit in varying degree.
The pro and con positions themselves are largely categorical-
one is preferable, the other lamentable. The foundations of the argu-
ment are philosophical. They deal with the role of judges in a demo-
cratic system.
The argument that balancing is not defensible is driven in part by
the view that balancing is not possible.57 Even if individuals can bal-
ance for themselves, the process is so indeterminate that we have no
good way to share a definition, or to reach determinate results.58 If
we cannot define it, we cannot show people how to do it, and thus, we
cannot use it. Claiming to balance is merely a cover for indefensible
55. See, e.g., T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96
YALE L.J. 943 (1987); Frank M. Coffin, Judicial Balancing: The Protean Scales of Justice,
63 N.Y.U. L. REv. 16 (1988); Laura A. Lundquist, Weighing the Factors of Drug Testing for
Fourth Amendment Balancing, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1151 (1992); Burt Neuborne, Notes
for a Theory of Constrained Balancing in First Amendment Cases: An Essay in Honor of
Tom Emerson, 38 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 576 (1988); Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court
and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L.
REv. 1091, 1101-08 (1986); Melissa Taylor, The VMI Decision: A Look at the Balancing
Process in Equal Protection Cases, 60 UMKC L. REv. 393, 396-97 (1991); Mark V. Tshnet,
Anti-Formalism in Recent Constitutional Theory, 83 MIcH. L. REv. 1502, 1508-19 (1985).
56. See Henkin, supra note 6, at 1046-49.
57. Justice Scalia, in the language that titled this Symposium, has described balancing
as "more like judging whether a particular line is longer than a particular rock is heavy."
Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., 486 U.S. 888, 897 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
58. Aleinikoff, supra note 55, at 973. Justice Black, as a result, saw balancing as a
weak defense of liberty as well as unauthorized by the text. See Konigsberg v. State Bar,
366 U.S. 36, 61-68 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109,
138-39, 143-44 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting). Kalven points out that Black himself en-
dorsed balancing in some types of cases. Harry Kalven, Jr., Upon Rereading Mr. Justice
Black on the First Amendment, 14 UCLA L. REv. 428, 442 (1967).
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judicial discretion. These have been global arguments. Balancing is
good or bad, satisfactory or dangerous.
If balancing is possible and defensible, then decision making can
and should include compelling interests, public values, and a host of
competing considerations.5 9 If balancing is impossible, then there is
more reason to banish these competing considerations in favor of for-
malism via studies of usage and meaning, or to treat interests in a
different noncomparative way. 60
The dispute over categorization and balancing is miscast for three
reasons. First, the methods are not often determinative.61 Second,
the methods can often be translated into one another.62 Third, as ex-
plored below, the dispute is miscast because the decision between bal-
ancing and not balancing is illusory. The only "real" decisions are
when intuitive judgments, whether described as balancing or other-
wise, should be allowed to enter the analysis, which assumptions
should be articulated, and which should be left inchoate.
It is my purpose to decouple the various inquiries about balanc-
ing and interests. To do this, three issues must be considered. First, is
it possible to balance? Second, what are the proper occasions for intu-
itive judgments which we often refer to as balancing? As I hope to
show, the answer to the second issue need not depend on the answer
to the first; whether we can build or calibrate a scale does not deter-
mine whether we should try to "weigh" values. Third, how are com-
pelling interests to be interpreted? The third issue will be considered
in Part IV.
A. The Problem of Balancing
This Subpart explores why balancing does not appear possible. It
is important to clarify that balancing as used in this Article is not re-
stricted to what the Court calls "balancing," or even to the conscious
articulation of competing values. Rather, balancing is used more
59. See Coffin, supra note 55, at 21, 41; Neuborne, supra note 55, at 578-83 (describing
the advantages of "constrained balancing"); William D. Popkin, A Common Law Lawyer
on the Supreme Court: The Opinions of Justice Stevens, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1087 (describing
Stevens' preference for considering all factors).
60. See Aleinikoff, supra note 55, at 1002-04; Scalia, Originalism, supra note 2; Scalia,
Rule of Law, supra note 2.
61. Sullivan, supra note 1, at 241.
62. Cf. Frank I. Michelman, Discretionary Interests-Takings, Motives, and Unconsti-
tutional Conditions: Commentary on Radin and Sullivan, 55 ALB. L. REv. 619, 619-20




broadly to refer to logically similar reasoning processes, whether con-
scious or articulate, and at any level of analysis, that take competing
values into account by treating some as more important (or as being
more at stake) and others as less important (or as being less at stake).
Conversely, this broader understanding of balancing implies that
the following argument is not an argument in favor of a particular
formula. Rather, the following argument is meant to establish essen-
tial elements in processes of judicial choice, regardless of verbal
formula.
"Balancing" is a term for a process in an opaque box that is unde-
fined and undefinable, but is supposed to produce a right or best an-
swer.63 We have tended to reserve the term for that mysterious
process for situations when we cannot measure and compare compet-
ing considerations. If we had a way of quantifying all the appropriate
inputs, and a way of comparing them, and a theory that told us how to
do so, we would not call it balancing. Rather, it would be called some-
thing like "deriving the most cost-effective solution," or just "solving
the problem." Some applications of decision engineering give us a
best solution,64 and the balancing label seems unnecessary for them.
The attack on balancing65 has been driven by comparison to the
standard created by the kinds of decision engineering that produce
demonstrably correct answers by intelligible processes. 66 Balancing
63. Balancing has long seemed a mystery. See Aleinikoff, supra note 55, at 976. But
Cf. JOHN S. CARROLL & ERIC J. JOHNSON, DECISION RESEARCH: A FIELD GunE (1990).
Carroll and Johnson describe the use of a linear regression model "to pull the decision
makers up by their own bootstraps":
The basic reason for this phenomenon is that the linear regression model is
consistent in representing some of what the decision makers consider important.
The model never gets confused, never makes wild guesses, never gets distracted
by a novel piece of information, and never gets tired. Apparently, decision mak-
ers are inconsistent enough in following their own implicit rules that they do
worse than their own models.
Id. at 57. These results are based on a comparison of decisions that predict outcomes with
rules that predict outcomes.
64. See ROBIN M. HOGARTH, JUDGMENT AND CHOICE: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF DEcI-
SION 242-77 (2d ed. 1987); Michael J. Saks & Robert F. Kidd, Human Information Process-
ing and Adjudication: Trial By Heuristics, in JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING: AN
INTERDISCIPLINARY READER 232-40 (Hal R. Arkes & Kenneth R. Hammond eds., 1986)
[hereinafter JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING] (arguing that statistical evidence is more
accurate than unaided judgments by judges and jurors or than witness testimony).
65. See supra note 57.
66. See Aleinikoff, supra note 55, at 976 ("To a large extent, the balancing takes place
inside a black box."); see also Aleinikoff's comparison of balancing to alternative modes of
decision making, id. at 1002-04, where he regards balancing as relatively fuzzy. SCHAUER,
supra note 50, at 137-39, 149-55, argues that rules reduce decision-maker error, though his
argument in favor of rules delves into many other facets of the difference between rules
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appears to be a kind of magic or mystery, or worse, a whitewash for
some less fair process. Lacking a way to balance, we should not use
the metaphor or analyze its parts.
Each element of this quest for a demonstrable means to clearly
superior solutions to constitutional conflict dissolves under the stress
of complex reality. Putting aside the problems of collective decision
making for multimember courts,67 in order for individuals to make
rational decisions, they need to have the ability to predict the out-
comes of decisions, the effect of those outcomes on their goals, and
the effect of those outcomes on other competing goals.68 These tend
to be quite difficult judgments. 69
Still more daunting, individually rational decisions require the in-
dividual to compare values, preferably by quantification but at least
by rank ordering. 70 But we have no good way of comparing the im-
and standards. See, e.g., id. at 158-62; see also supra note 63. TuIshnet, supra note 55, at
1503-16, traces the attack on balancing to Hobbesian theory and the resulting question of
who guards the guardians. In the case of judicial review the guardians are judges. The
effort is to constrain them via limitations on their discretion. But the complexity of conse-
quences and the inability to compare values and specify the level of generality at which
issues should be compared without a guiding moral theory makes balancing hard to con-
fine. Up to this point Tushnet's argument is both perceptive and convincing. Tushnet
takes his argument about balancing a point further, however, and seems to go astray. He
believes that "if we invoke some substantive theory of constitutional law to specify the
level [of generality], we are no longer engaged in balancing." Id. at 1514. He does not
make it clear why balancing is not required within as well as between moral theories.
Tushnet points to the choice of moral theory as a breach of neutrality, though, as I am sure
he would agree, the very notion of neutrality among moral theories is itself internally in-
consistent and no less controversial than the choice of a theory. Tushnet also claims that
categorical analysis replaces balancing with "a formal substantive theory." Id. at 1514-15.
For reasons discussed below,.I find it misleading to claim that balancing has been excluded
from apparently formal rules.
67. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 802
(1982).
68. See RICHARD NISBETr & LEsS Ross, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND
SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT (1980); see also JAMES G. MARCH, DECISIONS AND
ORGANIZATIONS 1-3, 268-70 (1988).
69. See Saks & Kidd, supra note 64, at 220-21 (discussing "[t]he three fundamental
heuristics... [which cause people to err in their judgments]: representativeness, availabil-
ity, and anchoring and adjustment"); see also NiSBETr & Ross, supra note 68 (discussing
the source of error in human calculation); DUCAT, supra note 14, at 110 (objecting to "ul-
tra-rational, comprehensive calculation[s]" because of the difficulties of judgment).
Ducat's objection is not to the ambiguity of judgment but to the difficulty of solving
problems at broad and complex levels. Thinking of balancing only in its ad hoc variety he
equates it with incrementalism which he finds preferable to deciding among rules-a larger
and more difficult decision. DUCAT, supra note 14, at 121-22.
70. See IRVING L. JANIS & LEON MANN, DECISION MAKING: A PSYCHOLOGICAL
ANALYSIS OF CONFLICT, CHOICE, AND COMMITMENT 174-75 (1977) (stating that rational
decisions require consideration of costs and benefits); JAMES W. LOEWEN, SOCIAL SCIENCE
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portance of consequences to different people. Indeed, when we speak
of balancing, we are often speaking in a philosophically utilitarian
mode.7' The fundamental problem with utilitarianism has been the
impossibility of true interpersonal comparisons of benefits and
harms.72
For most of the issues debated, there is no scale that measures the
quality of alternatives or even ranks results. Apples, oranges, Mozart,
and Dali are incomparable. Without a common scale, balancing is not
intelligible. It cannot be described, and can hardly be improved.
A group of scholars has argued that interests are, and should be,
"unfocused" (to borrow Robert Nagel's phrase).73 However, vague-
ness in the weight, if not in the extent of interests, is not only inherent
in balancing, but also part of the problem. Is it appropriate to incor-
porate interests into legal decision making without precision?
Efforts have been made to overcome the difficulty of making in-
terpersonal comparisons of benefits and harms, and thereby provide
some form of a social calculus. If a social calculus existed, balancing
could occur in a nonmysterious way. Pareto criteria have been used in
such an effort, but turn out to be largely insufficient.74 While the mar-
ket reduces interpersonal values to exchange values, it reflects preex-
isting resource allocations, rather than directly measuring
interpersonal values.75 Rank ordering is sometimes possible, but re-
quires unanimity to bridge the interpersonal difficulty.7 6 Alterna-
tively, some algorithm like "one person, one vote" might be adopted,
but that is inappropriate for many problems because of the vastly dif-
IN THE COURTROOM: STATISTICAL TECHNIQUES AND RESEARCH METHODS FOR WINNING
CLAss-ACrION Surs 95-114 (1982) (giving examples of the use of rank orders in statistical
assessments); Laurent B. Frantz, Is the First Amendment Law?-A Reply to Professor
Mendelson, 51 CAL. L. REV. 729, 747-49 (1963) (concluding that the quantification cannot
be done).
71. Rights-based theories also require balancing with a more limited set of values, or
with a set of weights favoring certain values.
72. See Jules L. Coleman, Efficiency, Utility and Wealth Maximization, 8 HoFSTRA L.
REv. 509, 511-12, 515 (1980), reprinted, with minor changes, in JULES L. COLEMAN, MAR-
KETS, MORALS AND THE LAW 96, 100 (1988).
73. Robert F. Nagel, "Unfocused" Governmental Interests, in PUBLIC VALUES IN CON-
SITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 1, at 45.
74. See Coleman, supra note 72, at 95-132.
75. Ian Shapiro, Three Fallacies Concerning Majorities, Minorities and Democratic
Politics, in MAJOITIES AND MINORITIES 79, 81-94 (John W. Chapman & Alan Wertheimer
eds., 1990).
76. See id. at 92-93, on an effort to state a rule of unanimity for social judgments.
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fering intensities of feeling and degrees to which people are affected. 77
Each such algorithm is based on an independent value choice. The
underlying personal values resist comparison.
Without a principled way to compare benefits and burdens, or a
common yardstick to measure the way they are experienced by differ-
ent members of society, balancing cannot be precisely described, and
it is impossible to check whether it was correctly done (or even to
define what might be "correct," for that matter).
These are powerful criticisms. They accurately reveal the dis-
tance between balancing and a form of logical thinking. These criti-
cisms of course apply to any intuitive process for resolving a conflict
of values. "Balancing" is just a special case, or name, for resolving
these conflicts in a way that cannot be seen or defined.
Some distinguish intuition from balancing.78 Even if intuition is
different, it is no less mysterious than balancing. Indeed, it is more
mysterious. Balancing makes sense despite its difficulties. Choice re-
flects a comparison of values-"balancing." When faced with a
choice, pick the better one. Intuition among competing alternatives,
on the other hand, can be understood either as a current choice (bal-
ancing), as repetition of a past choice, or as yet another mystery like
gut-feeling. The problem with treating intuition as repetition is that
the situations are rarely identical. Thus, intuition must be either bal-
ancing or a mystery. So, take your pick.
Indeed, these criticisms also apply to other approaches that pur-
port neither to balance nor intuit, but that do not provide a suffi-
ciently precise yardstick to resolve contemporary controversies in part
because of their levels of generality.79 David Faigman goes an impor-
tant step further: He asserts the balancing method is under attack for
a failure of substantive constitutional theory.80 If neutral principles
could be identified, they would contribute to constitutional analysis in
all modes of discourse.
Nevertheless, for all their insight, the global all-or-nothing argu-
ments against balancing that we have been considering will turn out to
be irrelevant if everything is balancing, nothing is balancing, or if the
useful question about balancing is contextual so that balancing is
77. See ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOcRATIc THEORY 90-123 (Univ. of
Chi. Press 1962) (1956).
78. See Aleinikoff, supra note 55, at 945, 997-98.
79. Cf. id. (arguing that not all decisions "[i]n life and law" can be "characterized as
balancing").
80. Faigman, supra note 13, at 648-55.
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sometimes good and sometimes not, even in constitutional law. The
next Subpart will consider the counterargument that in fact everything
is balancing. It explores why balancing is inevitable.
B. The Alternative of Rules
Rules are designed to allocate decision-making authority, as well
as to control discretion. 81 With rules, instead of an undefinable
opaque box, judges have a set of instructions that can be described
reasonably well and can be applied in a sufficiently clear way that one
can often check on the correctness of a particular judge's use of them.
Interests could play a role in the application of rules. But their
role would appear to be very different. Judges would not "weigh"
public interests but claim to "invoke" them. In Herrera v. Collins82
the Court seemed to invoke finality rather than weigh it. Interests
invoked in the application of rules are described in a truncated or di-
chotomous fashion (finality was at issue for the majority in Herrera,
not somewhat at issue). Nevertheless, interests may function inexplic-
itly and perhaps without conscious reflection (perhaps the majority
did in some sense weigh finality).
Substantive rules simplify decision making by selecting which
conditions83 or criteria84 will control and excluding others, or by pri-
oritizing and sequencing issues85 for separate and perhaps definitive
evaluation.86 Rules have the advantage of simplicity; people can han-
dle them.87
81. See SCHAUER, supra note 50, at 158-62.
82. 113 S. Ct. 853 (1993).
83. E.g., speaker's location on a streetcorner is a condition of the neutrality
requirement.
84. E.g., malice as a criteria for liability in libel, inequality as a criteria for liability in
some interstate commerce cases and in discrimination cases.
85. This is common in remedial situations: E.g., law must be considered before eq-
uity, chosen measures must be evaluated before proposed better solutions in discrimina-
tion and districting cases.
86. These rule forms should be compared with forms of what Herbert Simon de-
scribed as "bounded rationality," particularly "satisficing" and "elimination by aspects"-
selecting an alternative because it meets stated criteria, regardless of whether a more com-
plete analysis would show that other alternatives met the criteria better. See JANIS &
MANN, supra note 70, at 25-26,31. Compare also with what March described as a "garbage
can" model of decision making in which solutions look for problems. See MARCH, supra
note 68, at 5,13,294-99. Another form of selection by criteria is decision making by work-
ing backward. See id. at 270.
87. See JANIS & MANN, supra note 70, at 22 (discussing suboptimizing); MARCH, supra
note 68, at 12-14 (discussing sources of complexity); Herbert A. Simon, Alternative Visions
of Rationality, in JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY READER,
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Accepting this argument for the moment, there are correlative
disadvantages: by simplifying, rules inherently incorporate major
losses, primarily of information and proportion. 8  Consequences of
greater and lesser import are either misjudged by a rule-driven pro-
cess or the process is subverted by a covert balancing. 89
The argument for rules is sometimes buttressed by the assump-
tion that rules will be corrected by other invisible processes. For ex-
ample, people are often assumed to act rationally, or tend toward a
statistical approximation of rational behavior, or it is assumed that
over the long-term various "invisible hands" push people toward "cor-
rect" answers.90 Those assumptions sometimes help to model groups
of decisions, but without helping to make the decisions themselves. If
and to the extent that such a process theory is to work and provide a
feedback loop to guide rulemaking, there must be a combination of
normative and empirical work to evaluate the feedback and steer ac-
cordingly. 91 I am not very optimistic that such mechanical processes
supra note 64, at 102-05 (on human limitations in dealing with the complexity of decision
making).
88. March wrote: "He [Herbert Simon] suggested that human beings develop deci-
sion procedures that are sensible, given the constraints, even though they might not be
sensible if the constraints were removed." MARCH, supra note 68, at 270. And he com-
mented: "The search for intelligence in decision-making is an effort to rationalize apparent
anomalies in behavior." Id. at 271.
89. See SCHAUER, supra note 50, at 31-37, 207-12.
90. E.g., the common law, the market and private ordering, or the business judgment
rule.
91. For a discussion of the unreliability of process models, see MARCH, supra note 68,
at 9-12. March and Olsen wrote, "Organizations, and the people in them, learn from their
experience.... If the information is accurate, the goals clear and unchanging, the infer-
ences correct, the behavior modification appropriate, and the environment stable, the pro-
cess will result in improvement over time." James G. March & Johan P. Olsen, The
Uncertainty of the Past: Organizational Learning under Ambiguity, in MARCH, supra note
68, at 356.
As we have come to recognize the limitations on rational calculation, planning, and
forecasting as bases for intelligence in many organizations, interest in the potential for
organizational learning has increased. That interest, however, tends to underestimate the
extent to which adaptive rationality is limited by characteristics of human actors and orga-
nizations. The authors "suggest a view of reality forming that emphasizes the impact of
interpersonal connections within the organization and the affective connection between
the organization and the participant on the development of belief, as well as the interaction
between seeing and liking." Id.
Michael D. Cohen et al., A Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice, in MARCH,
supra note 68, at 294, describe decision processes in an organization that "discovers prefer-
ences through action more than it acts on the basis of preferences," id. at 295, which "oper-
ates on the basis of simple trial-and-error procedures, the residue of learning from the
accidents of past experience, and pragmatic inventions of necessity," id., in which
"[p]articipants vary in the amount of time and effort they devote to different domains,"
and in which "the audiences and decision-makers for any particular kind of choice change
[Vol. 45
will work well. The diversity of normative inputs frustrates resolution
of complex sociolegal issues. There are areas where this approach is
most effective, but there is no reason to expect such invisible or auto-
matic correctives to work better than explicit balancing.9 2
The fundamental arguments for rule-based decisions are that they
protect the authority of the elected branches of government from
overly active courts93 and eliminate judicial discretion. 94 Rules do al-
locate decision-making authority between rule makers, including
courts, and rule appliers. Nevertheless, allocation of decision-making
authority is not unique to categorical rules. Decision-making author-
ity can be and is allocated in balancing modes through burdens and
presumptions. 95 Thus, balancing modes do include tools to curb
overly active courts.
The second claim for use of rules-to constrain judicial discre-
tion-is based on a misunderstanding or simplification. This is true
for two reasons. First, radical discretion is bound into the choice of
what rules to announce and maintain. Thus, rules incorporate balanc-
ing a step deeper in the analytical regression. 96 Second, balancing is
ubiquitous within what we describe as rules-indeed, it is hard to
capriciously." Id. In this situation they find a "garbage can" model of decision making in
which "an organization is a collection of choices looking for problems, issues and feelings
looking for decision situations in which they might be aired, solutions looking for issues to
which they might be the answer, and decision-makers looking for work." Id. at 296.
"[Olne can view a choice opportunity as a garbage can into which various kinds of
problems and solutions are dumped by participants as they are generated." Id.
"It is clear that the garbage can process does not resolve problems well." Id. at 323.
They add, however, that "[m]easured against a conventional normative model of rational
choice, the garbage can process does appear pathological, but such standards are not really
appropriate. The process occurs precisely when the preconditions of more normal rational
models are not met." Id. at 323. On their normative judgment about the process, see infra
note 146.
92. MARCH, supra note 68, at 8-12.
93. See SCHAuER, supra note 50, at 158-62.
94. See Scalia, Rule of Law, supra note 2; see also Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S.
36, 63-64, 67-68, 75 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109,
138-39, 143-44 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting). Black's objections were in part the reverse of
Scalia's. Black worried that balancing was too weak a test that allowed the Court to avoid
implementing constitutional restrictions. Scalia fears that balancing is too strong a test that
allows the Court to impose its own will on the Constitution and the other branches.
95. See Neuborne, supra note 55, at 579-80. A corollary of reduced discretion is
greater predictability or "certainty" for laypersons.
96. Categorization masks balancing (i.e., a determination about what is "satisfactory"
or "good enough" to "solve the problem"). Balancing is inescapable in the development,
reevaluation, and growth of rules and categories as well as in some applications. More-
over, sequential comparisons are inadequate substitutes for less constrained balancing. See
JAms & MANN, supra note 70, at 21-41.
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avoid. Categorization is often balancing; it requires deciding which
category to put things in, and that is often done by noticing the conse-
quences and deciding (often subconsciously) if they are tolerable, bet-
ter, or worse than certain alternatives. 97 Similarly, motives are
discerned as an evaluation of how someone else would balance a par-
ticular set of competing pressures.98
Formal categories can be manipulated by precise nonintuitive
means, like the rules of logic, but human reasoning is rarely that air-
tight.99 Conflicting goals can be prioritized but the priorities will
probably result from intuitive judgment. If the precise consequences
of different rules of priority could be determined through a scientific
One can have rules for the creation of rules. It is not necessary to abandon judicial
rulemaking in favor of ad hoc balancing or purely arbitrary pronouncements for all rule
creation. But clearly there is a limit.
97. Fallon reaches a similar conclusion on the basis of contemporary legal discourse.
See Fallon, supra note 6, at 361. See also the discussion of Employment Div., Dep't of
Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), in Faigman, supra note 13, at 671-76;
Coffin, supra note 55, at 21 ("A priori general principles could resolve few concrete
cases."), 28 (describing "subterranean" balancing); Paul G. Kauper, Book Review, 58
MICH. L. REV. 619,626 (1960) (reviewing ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM
(1960)); Neuborne, supra note 55, at 578 ("[O]ften unarticulated, even unconscious, bal-
ancing takes place in difficult cases."); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions,
102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1428-56 (1989).
98. See Stephen E. Gottlieb, Reformulating the Motive/Effects Debate in Constitu-
tional Adjudication, 33 WAYNE L. REV. 97 (1986); Margaret Jane Radin, Government Inter-
ests and Takings: Cultural Commitments of Property and the Role of Political Theory, in
PUBLIC VALUES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 1, at 69.
99. Decisions can also be reached by what psychologically feels like definition of lan-
guage or direct recognition of similarities. See Simon, supra note 87, at 107-09. But di-
rectly matching categories to reality is not always possible. The ambiguities of all methods
leave room for an intuitive process which we cannot now precisely define.
Moreover the price of making decisions according to purely formal criteria is exclu-
sion of concern with the consequences of decision making. Those concerns can of course
be incorporated in shaping rules, but then that decision was undertaken in a nonformal
way, no doubt via balancing of some kind. For a related analysis of analogical reasoning,
see Richard Warner, Three Theories of Legal Reasoning, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1523, 1552-55
(1989) (specifying no basis for finding similarity).
The dispute between formalists and anti-formalists appears to be at the root of much
of the balancing debate. In his justly praised analysis of balancing, Aleinikoff, supra note
55, at 947, 1005, correctly argues that balancing can be avoided but he appears to concur in
rejecting formalism as well. He reconciles these positions by constructing a nonformalist,
nonbalancing past. Id. at 949-52, 1001-02. In fact, despite his own anti-balancing rhetoric,
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 430 (1819), balancing was very much part
of the arsenal of Chief Justice Marshall, see id. at 419, 421, 432 (evaluating policy conse-
quences to reach his conclusion). Other major figures of the early judiciary, including
Chief Justice Taney and Justice Story, also used balancing. See, e.g., Charles River Bridge
v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420, 547-48, 552-53 (1837); id. at 608 (Story, J., dissent-
ing). But see id. at 605. On formalism and balancing, see also Gottlieb, Overriding Public
Values, supra note 4, at 12-13.
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analysis of data, the consequences would probably still have to be
weighed intuitively in order to pick the appropriate rule. Reasoning
by analogy does not alter that conclusion-a choice may be more like
one alternative than another, but that is likely the result of a process
of balancing values or consequences.
This multiple invasion of the intuitive scales of justice into the
province of rules (as choice, categorization, and weight) is not acci-
dental. Intuition is built into the very structure of decision making.
Max Weber spelled out the limits of social science at the turn of this
century, 1'0 and the limits of philosophy were spelled out in the period
of the enlightenment by Hume and others.1 1 At some point formal
chains of reasoning end. Conclusions about values, about what is
good and bad, require intuitive judgments. Any specific judgment
about what is good for people logically can be made in a formal way
but only on the shoulders of a preceding intuitive judgment. Balanc-
ing reflects those intuitive judgments in the context of conflicting
goals.'02 It is part of the process of social thought. Our only choice is
to decide where in the process of reasoning it should be placed.
In turn, conflicting goals are built into constitutional law. It has
not been part of the constitutional discourse either to read the Bill of
Rights out of the Constitution or to eliminate judicial review entirely.
Rather, those urging judicial restraint have been seeking greater re-
spect for federalism and the separation of powers. But these goals
conflict with other constitutional goals in at least some instances. 10 3
Indeed, both federalism and the separation of powers have deeper
purposes-among them "to secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves
and our posterity."'104 Whatever rules one constructs out of those con-
flicting goals are necessarily the result of some process of judgment,
100. Max Weber, Science as a Vocation, in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY
151-52 (H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds. & trans., 1958).
101. See DAVID HuME, AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS 125-
36 (Open Court Publishing Co. 1966) (1751).
102. Steven Shiffrin, The First Amendment and Economic Regulation: Away from a
General Theory of the First Amendment, 78 Nw. U. L. REv. 1212, 1249 (1983). Shiffrin
remarked that "balancing is nothing more than a metaphor for the accommodation of val-
ues." Id. Aleinikoff took issue with that claim by positing that a variety of other ap-
proaches differ from balancing, including analogical reasoning, multi-prong tests, and
intuitive answers. Aleinikoff, supra note 55, at 945. Those alternative rules of decision
may be formal, in which case they support Aleinikoff's point, but they need not be. My
disagreement with Aleinikoff is in part a product of my analysis of the logical structure of
what he treats as alternatives to balancing, and in part a broader definition of balancing
that incorporates logically similar operations in processes we describe by different names.
103. See, e.g., U.S. Co NsT. amend. XIV.
104. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
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which is intuitive and may fairly (if only metaphorically) be described
as balancing.
Among the other principles that the Court must respect are prin-
ciples of democracy and human rights. Whatever may be said of John
Ely's elaboration of the democratic principle, Justice Stone was clearly
correct in United States v. Carolene Products when he pointed out that
respect for the legislature required by principles of democracy cannot
hold true when the legislature attacks the fundamental processes on
which democratic self-government is based. The tragic legacy of twen-
tieth-century totalitarianism has been a renewed conviction that there
are some things that no person, nation, or people is entitled to do,
among them murder and mayhem. Luckily, these and other principles
are already incorporated within our Constitution. In addition to the
tragic meaning that the Holocaust has had for the Jews and others, it
has spawned a revolution in both liberal and conservative twentieth
century thought, as reflected in different ways by people like Ronald
Dworkin,10 5 H.L.A. Hart,10 6 Robert Nozick,10 7 and John Rawls. 10 8
Thus, there are conflicting principles for courts to consider and there
is no escape from the requirement of balancing at some point in the
analysis. 109
Discretion, for all these reasons, is not unique to balancing or
foreign to rules, and it can be shaped and limited in both contexts.
The apparently formal alternative conceals or relocates the balancing
without eliminating it, and reshapes what seems important in the bal-
ancing accomplished. What appear to be nonbalancing approaches
are often simply bad balancing-unarticulated and unexamined intu-
itions about the balance of factors described as something else.
However, none of this analysis suggests that rules may not play
an appropriate and productive part in judicial decision making. The
constraint of rules is not always counterproductive." 0 It is important
105. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIorS SERIOUSLY (1977) (developing a "strong"
theory of individual rights).
106. H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV.
593, 615-21 (1958) (discussing the challenge of the Holocaust for positivism).
107. ROBERT NoziCK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA (1974) (developing a "Kantian"
theory of rights).
108. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971) (reviving interest in inalienable
rights).
109. See Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 51 (1961); Wallace Mendelson, The First
Amendment and the Judicial Process: A Reply to Mr. Frantz, 17 VAND. L. REv. 479,481-84
(1964); see also Henkin, supra note 6, at 1024.
110. Rules or categories that leave no room for feedback and modification should
quickly be discarded as perverse. See MARCH, supra note 68, at 8-12 (describing both the
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to determine when the constraints help. The important issue, then, is
not whether to balance (that much is inescapable), but how and at
what stage in the process to balance.
C. Paradox
The arguments over balancing create a paradox. We cannot bal-
ance; the skeptics are right. And yet we balance all the time; the skep-
tics are wrong. Impossible. And interests are the football of that
contest.
D. OK, So What's "Really" Going On?
The objective of this Subpart is to transcend the rules-balancing
argument, explore what works under what conditions, and make clear
that fundamental values, of which interests are instances, are inherent
in all modes of decision making.
We begin by trying to break down the metaphor of balancing."'
If it is not a metaphor, then it must be the case that we can ascribe
values and make comparisons. It is important to know the extent to
which that is true. There may be a continuum from problems that can
be balanced in a describable and logical manner to problems that can
be balanced only metaphorically and intuitively. All of the problems
of rational decision making define this continuum. Moreover, it is not
clear in principle that any problem that cannot now be balanced other
than intuitively will always remain resistant to more precise modes of
balancing. Thus, one objective is to try to push back the areas where
there is no common scale on which to make comparisons. A second is
to avoid losing important values in that effort. And a third goal is to
define whatever it means to improve decision making where balancing
must be intuitive.
If balancing is a metaphor, it is because we cannot ascribe values
and make comparisons."12 In other words, we do not balance because
we cannot. What we do is something else. But what we call balancing
is affected by and includes calculations that are not adequately de-
scribed as categorization, and are not explicitly taken into account by
perversity of such rules and the resistance to changing rules that have been partially "suc-
cessful"). Fundamentally, there are significant losses of information and misvaluation in
"noncomparative" forms. See JAms & MANN, supra note 70, at 21-41.
111. See Kahn, supra note 52, at 3 ("The concept of 'balancing' is itself both a meta-
phor and an abstraction.").
112. Weighing is clearly metaphoric for Janis and Mann. JANIs & MAN, supra note
70, at 144-45, 174-75.
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such alternate strategies. 113 That is why the metaphor survives even
though efforts to define balancing founder over an undefinable intui-
tive or judgmental opaque box.
Efforts to escape to categorization founder over the same undefi-
nable opaque box. The arguments against balancing attacked it for its
undefinable intuitions and impressionistic judgments." 4 The argu-
ments for rules are based on the clarity of reasoning rules offer." 5
Thus, both the critique of balancing and the preference for rules treat
the inability to define the judgment process as unacceptable. But
rules are based on and incorporate intuitive judgments, often the very
balancing they were meant to replace. 1 6 Thus, both balancing and
rules depend on intuitive judgments we do not know how to
explain. 17
There is a third alternative to the rejections of both rules and
balancing because of their intuitive foundations: accept the opaque
box and try to improve its output."8 I will refer to it as an output-
focused approach. That effort would take two directions: (1) a non-
normative exploration of what modes are possible, and (2) a norma-
tive exploration of what improves the process. To make the process
better, perhaps we should accept the inaccuracy of human speech, and
113. See Robert F. Nagel, Liberals and Balancing, 63 U. COLO. L. REv. 319, 321
(1992).
114. See supra text accompanying notes 63-80.
115. See supra text accompanying notes 81-87.
116. See supra text accompanying notes 95-110.
117. But cf. Simon, supra note 87, at 97. Simon points out that optimizing subjective
expected utility (SEU) requires or rather depends on a set of very subjective judgments to
make the calculations even possible. Id. at 101-02. Simon concludes that it is therefore
impossible for decision makers actually to apply the SEU model. "I have already sug-
gested what the principal reason is for this departure. It is that human beings have neither
the facts nor the consistent structure of values nor the reasoning power at their disposal
that would be required, even in these relatively simple situations, to apply SEU principles."
Id. at 102-03. Based on that observation he moves to a behavioral alternative. Id. at 103.
The bounded rationality which Simon describes requires "some way of focusing attention,"
id. at 104, "a mechanism capable of generating alternatives," id. at 105, and ways to gather
information and draw "inferences from these facts," id. These, of course, do not dispense
with balancing in an opaque box. They only circumscribe the complexity of the judgments
that are made. Simon locates intuition in a process of recognition of familiar circum-
stances. Id. at 107-09.
118. See WITrGNSTEIN, supra note 34, § 242, at 88e:
If language is to be a means of communication there must be agreement not only
in definitions but also (queer as this may sound) in judgments. This seems to
abolish logic, but does not do so.-It is one thing to describe methods of measure-
ment, and another to obtain and state results of measurement. But what we call




simply examine what improves the process, without insisting that
judges follow a particular mode of reconciliation. 119 If they fail to do
what they say they do, but achieve better results than when they work
in a mode in which they can perform exactly as described, it may be
preferable to let that be enough, and to assist the process. Still more
is this so when we find that an undefinable process of judgment or
intuition is an inescapable part of decision making, including both
what we call balancing and much of what we call categorizing. In
other words, this output-focused approach would jettison insistence
that our mental process and our metaphors track each other. Whether
they should can only be discovered, not preordained. The mind may
not be capable of balancing, and legal issues may not be amenable to
precise methods of problem solving. Nevertheless, the question is not
whether these problems can be solved in a manner describable with
precision, but rather, what is accomplished when judges do what ap-
pears to be intuitive, and can that process be improved.
Nor is it sufficient to observe how judges balance. We can be
good Humian positivist observers and discover the physical and psy-
chological processes or the linguistic or hermeneutic ones, none of
which will tell us whether judges doing the balancing should have
given a different answer.120 Instead those researches reflect back to
judges only what they do.' 2 1
We might define the right answer as whatever people do, but that
tells a decision maker nothing about what to do; it merely shifts the
moral "ought" to an explanation for deference to fallible human judg-
ment. It is an appropriate method for issues properly resolved by
democratic procedures. We know, however, that popular beliefs do
not reliably predict consequences or future satisfaction, and may not
be acceptable with respect to the distributive consequences of decision
119. CARROLL & JOHNSON, supra note 63, at 47-48, 67-68 (describing the success of
decision models based solely on inputs and outputs in generating the actual rules of deci-
sion, although those models "don't give us a detailed explanation of how decisions are
made... [and] miss some important details of how the information is combined").
120. See MARcI, supra note 68, at 1-17; JANIS & MANN, supra note 70, at 21-41.
121. March argues that decision making need not be evaluated on the basis of preexist-
ing preferences, and that many decisions may turn out more defensible therefore. He also
argues that preferences may be evaluated rather than assumed. That brings decision mak-
ing back under scrutiny on the basis of an external standard. In this connection it is also
necessary to explore the role of choice in a representative capacity or against external
standards of justice and interpretation. Compare MARCH, supra note 68, at 12-15, 253-89
(on choice) with Stephen E. Gottlieb, The Dilemma of Election Campaign Finance Reform,
18 HoF'TRA L. REv. 213, 242-53 (1989).
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making. 122 Simple acceptance of popular belief is not an appropriate
method for courts when their role is to insist that the people and their
representatives adhere to constitutional limitations.
Nevertheless, what real people should do is limited by what they
can do.123 Thus, we have to take a look at strategies real people actu-
ally use. 24
Still, it does not follow that the best real people can do is re-
flected by what they can describe so precisely that a computer or an-
other person could replicate the reasoning and result without benefit
of an undefinable process of judgment, or even without being play-
ful.125 It is possible to evaluate and improve balancing even though it
cannot be described precisely. To explore that possibility, this portion
of the Article will examine research on decision making in the social
sciences and then tie that back to the legal context.
1. The Standard for "Improvement"
Any effort to improve a process requires a standard. Here the
social science literature confronts us at the outset with a serious diffi-
culty. It is not entirely clear to what extent the social science explora-
tion of decision making is based on a presumption of the benefits of
greater information, and to what extent the studies measure the bene-
fits from the decision maker's perspective based on whether he or she
subsequently regrets or implements the decision.126 A presumption is
patently unhelpful. Regret and implementation are hardly satisfac-
tory because of the normative difficulties they create.
Utilitarian theories based on maximizing pleasure and minimizing
pain are most consistent with a standard that evaluates decision mak-
ing by the resultant personal satisfaction and regret. But utilitarian-
ism is more consistent with aggregation of the satisfaction and regret
of all concerned than merely the decision maker's unique perspective.
Utilitarians would also object that subjective post hoc evaluations may
be wrong. 27 Kantian theories and other standards that impose exter-
nal criteria require evaluation by direct measure of outcomes rather
than individual satisfaction and regret. Because they have measured
122. See Ronald Dworkin, Liberal Community, 77 CAL. L. REv. 479, 480-84 (1989).
123. See MARCH, supra note 68, at 267, 270.
124. See JANIS & MANN, supra note 70, at 21-80; MARCH, supra note 68, at 1-17.
125. See JANIS & MANN, supra note 70, at 147-58, 165, 379; MARCH, supra note 68, at
253-65.
126. See JANIS & MANN, supra note 70, at 10-11, 147-58, 165, 379.
127. Statistical comparison among processes may overcome that objection for short
term calculations.
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success by different standards, existing studies of decision making do
not appear adequate to permit the evaluation of decision making from
the perspective of any external observer or affected individual. It is
possible that the proper mode of decision making may prove to be a
function of whatever seems to be the proper perspective.
In addition, judicial decision making has to be considered in com-
parison with the decision making of the body being reviewed-legisla-
ture, agency, or other official. The scope of factors admissible in both
utilitarian and Kantian modes of judgment will depend on somewhat
different judgments about the extent to which the legislature or other
body being reviewed can be presumed to have considered the proper
factors.128 This too is an issue left without resolution in the empirical
studies.
Finally, the standard for decision making cannot achieve "neu-
trality. ' 129 Those standards each inherently incorporate different
goals, whether they be a form of utilitarianism, a Kantian approach, or
something else. And different decision-making techniques will prove
better at satisfying one or another of those standards. Thus, data on
the performance of different decision-making techniques will inevita-
bly bear the stamp of the particular standard against which it was
measured. As noted above, data based on the rather too common
standard of the decision makers' subsequent satisfaction and regret
fails to satisfy any of the common standards of value.
2. Performance of Decision-Making Modes
While these problems prevent conclusive results from present
studies of the success or failure of decision-making techniques, there is
still value in considering the studies. One group of scholars has elabo-
rated a model of full consideration of factors in a balancing mode. 30
The balancing mode is most directly reflected in the social science
literature as "optimization":
Specialists on organizational decision making describe the opti-
mizing strategy as having the goal of selecting the course of action
with the highest payoff. Such a strategy requires estimating the
128. See generally BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, PRrVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITU-
TVON 34-39, 44-56, 71-80, 103-10, 205-09, 234 (1977) (describing the relationship among
judicial restraint, theories of justice, and expected behavior of decision makers being
reviewed).
129. See Kennedy, supra note 2.
130. See JAis & MANN, supra note 70, at 174-75, 406-09.
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comparative value of every viable alternative in terms of expected
benefits and costs.131
The balancing mode presents problems of comparability as described
above. Its major advantage consists in asking decision makers to
weigh considerations against each other, even though that weighing
process is subjective, imprecise, and not definable. 132 It is clearly the
preferred method where the decision-making resources are available
and the importance of the problems justifies a careful decision-making
strategy.133
In Herrera, balancing was hardly unmanageable. The Court
might have examined the burden of dealing with motions based on
newly discovered evidence in those states that did not have the Texas
rule preventing such motions. They might have considered the bur-
dens that would have been imposed merely by finding the Texas rule a
violation of due process. Hard evidence could easily have been gener-
ated, or simpler alternatives considered, or both. Instead, the Court
considered burdens without reference to any evidence about the im-
pact of this or any rule on Texas courts. 34 It dismissed an alternate
rule seriatim without examining the roots of due process in efforts to
insure accurate decision making. 35 Certainly, more could have been
attempted.
By contrast, consideration of all the consequences can be unman-
ageable. In the notorious case of the Nazi march in Skokie, Illinois,
such consideration could well have spun totally out of control as inter-
131. Id. at 21-22; see also MARCH, supra note 68, at 1-2. Ducat, however, assumes that
balancing approximates incrementalism because optimization is too difficult. DUCAT,
supra note 14, at 110, 121-22. See also the discussion of bounded rationality infra at notes
137-139 and accompanying text.
132. See Faigman, supra note 13; David L. Faigman, Reconciling Individual Rights and
Government Interests: Madisonian Principles Versus Supreme Court Practice, 78 VA. L.
REV. 1521, 1579-80 (1992); MARCH, supra note 68; JANIS & MANN, supra note 70. Decision
theory has also been developed to permit optimization in the face of uncertainty. See
MARCH, supra note 68, at 268-69. Another approach to balancing is described in CARROLL
& JOHNSON, supra note 63, at 47-48.
133. See CARROLL & JOHNSON, supra note 63, at 63-64:
While psychologists have spent much effort attacking expected utility as an
overly rational description of actual decision making, decision analysts interpret
the attacks on the descriptive adequacy of the theory as a criticism of people for
failing to "follow" the theory! Decision analysts take the prescriptive theory and
human failings as evidence of a need for decision engineering.
The authors' approach is to improve rather than abandon rational decision making or op-
timization by mathematical modeling.
134. See Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853, 861 (1993).
135. Id. at 864-66 (although considering other aspects of due process history).
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 45
acting personal feelings, statements, and behavior created a complex
web of new realities in Skokie and beyond.136
The difficulties of balancing or "optimization" have also led
scholars to define forms of "bounded rationality" in which various
rules of thumb substitute for fully comparative weighing of alterna-
tives.137 This includes accepting either any means or the first means
that meet stated criteria, or eliminating means that fail any stated cri-
teria (described as "satisficing" in the literature), even though the se-
lected alternative may turn out to produce much less benefit than
those rejected or not considered. 3 8 This weakness develops because
meeting or failing to meet criteria does not take account of how much
the criteria may be met or missed, and how much the alternatives
might exceed or fail the criteria. 39
In Herrera, the Court considered only the potential burden on the
courts. That, by itself, was too "disruptive" to be accepted although
we have no idea from the case just how much disruption might have
resulted and from what kind of relief. The Texas rule solved that
problem. Its failure to protect Herrera was simply irrelevant.
Rules of thumb-for example, no new grounds for writs that
would disrupt the courts-do not require balancing the entire panoply
of possibilities that would have to be considered to define the opti-
mum solution. But they do require balancing among more limited al-
ternatives.' 40 The disruption exceeded some implicit threshold in the
136. See Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 915 (1978);
Village of Skokie v. National Socialist Party of Am., 373 N.E.2d 21 (Ill. 1978); LEE C.
BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SocEry: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXTREMIsr SPEECH IN
AMERiCA 67-70 (1986).
137. Difficulties include time, attention, scarce resources, and search costs. See
MARCH, supra note 68, at 3, 12-14.
138. See JANis & MANN, supra note 70, at 21-41; MARCH, supra note 68, at 3-5, 272.
Study of bounded rationality was spurred also by the failure of decision makers to reach
optimal solutions. Bounded rationality is not optimal. See Simon, supra note 87.
139. As Simon has noted:
[R]ationality of the sort described by the behavioral model doesn't optimize, of
course. Nor does it even guarantee that our decisions will be consistent. As a
matter of fact, it is very easy to show the choices made by an organism having
these characteristics will often depend on the order in which alternatives are
presented.
Simon, supra note 87, at 106.
140. As Carroll and Johnson note, "[Miost information processing-especially for
high-level tasks such as decision making-is serial." CARROLL & JoHNsoN, supra note 63,
at 72. The elimination by aspects model is an example of serial decision making. The
authors note, however, that "[l]ower level cognitive tasks, such as identifying an object, are
essentially parallel. Future work may both drastically alter the validity of the assumption
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minds of the Herrera majority. Following Simon, we might call that
more limited mode of balancing "bounded balancing.' 141
The success of methods of bounded rationality has been mea-
sured against full optimization, in the context of limited information
or ability to process it.142 Social scientists have concluded from their
studies that decision-making shortcuts are appropriate for relatively
unimportant decisions, and fuller optimization is worth the time for
major ones. 143 The research therefore places each technique in appro-
priate contexts rather than evaluating any technique globally. The
success of techniques of bounded rationality defines an area in which
such techniques are preferable. Their failures define an area in which
fuller optimization is to be preferred. The research raises questions
about the conditions in which fuller optimization is possible and when
fuller analysis is preferable to misleading rules of thumb. Balancing,
or optimization, as understood in the social sciences, is a meaningful
process, with measurable benefits in both full and bounded
versions.144
that higher level tasks are serial, and provide new methods and models of parallelism." Id.
at 89.
141. See id. at 80, 86-88 (describing balancing in a criteria driven system).
142. See Helmut Jungermann, The Two Camps on Rationality, in JuDGMEN-r AND DE-
CISION MAKING, supra note 64, at 639 ("[Tlhe theoretical point of reference is still the SEU
model or some variant of it," i.e., planning for the optimization of outcomes by reference
to initial preferences).
143. See, e.g., id. at 627, 633. Jungermann notes:
Strategies differ with respect to the cognitive effort required and the probability
with which they lead to optimal solution (i.e., SEU maximizing, satisficing, elimi-
nation-by-aspects, coin flipping). Strategy selection is seen as contingent upon a
(cost-benefit) compromise between the decision maker's desire to make the best
decision and his or her negative feelings about investing time and effort in the
decision making process.
Id. at 633-34. In other words, time and effort are the crucial variables. But cf. DUCAT,
supra note 14 (rejecting optimization globally).
144. March points out that each form of rationality will work better than the others
under the appropriate conditions. The options include calculated rationality, learned be-
havior, conventional behavior, revelation, intuition, imitation, and expertise.
Among all of these, only calculated rationality really uses conscious preferences
of a current actor as a major consideration in making decisions. It is easy to show
that there exist situations in which any one of these alternative techniques will
make better decisions than the independent calculation of rational behavior by
ordinary individuals or institutions. The superiority of learned or conventional
behavior depends, in general, on the amount of experience it summarizes and the
similarity between the world in which the experience was accumulated and the
current world. The superiority of imitation depends, in general, on the relative
competence of actor and expert and the extent to which intelligent action is re-
producible but not comprehendible. At the same time, each form of intelligence
exposes an actor to the risks of corruption. Imitation risks a false confidence in
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Full optimization or balancing, when possible, fits comfortably
within jurisprudential systems that compare conditions. Plainly that
includes utilitarianism.145 Rights-based approaches and many inter-
pretive approaches, however, also imply hierarchies of value. 146 The
choice of a truncated system of decision making instead of a fully
comparative one can sacrifice those values as easily as an openly judg-
mental approach.
Different systems of values may require that we consider differ-
ent factors, but they do not tell us whether noncomparative systems
are better than judgmental ones. We are, as Arthur Leff once told us,
all we have.147 We simply have no way of knowing a priori whether in
fact one inadequate system of decision making will produce a better
result than another inadequate system of decision making. We can
only judge the results. The research that suggests satisfaction with
fully comparative judgmental systems for important decisions does
not necessarily imply that such systems will prove equally effective on
the basis of criteria other than satisfaction with the decisions. But it
certainly invites a look at the results. The fundamental question is the
significance, under whatever criteria we prefer, of whatever may be
left out or included.
If balancing cannot be categorically banished from the temple of
justice, it is valuable to take a look at the major means of improve-
the neutrality of the process of diffusion; calculated rationality risks a false confi-
dence in the neutrality of rational argument; and so on.
MARCH, supra note 68, at 288. Indeed some decisions are indeterminate. See FOUNDA-
TIONS OF DECIsION THEORY: IssuEs AND ADVANcES 35-37 (Michael Bacharach & Susan
Hurley eds., 1991).
145. See Coffin, supra note 55, at 28.
146. Empirical studies of organizational behavior have suggested that optimization is
undermined by symbolic goals and by ambiguity about values that may be shaped by expe-
rience in partially Hegelian fashion. See MARCH, supra note 68, at 12-14, 269, 277. March
also suggests that descriptive "theories of choice might subordinate the idea of rationality
altogether to less intentional conceptions of the causal determinants of action" because
many observations of behavior are not consistent with efforts to achieve pre-defined goals.
Id. at 271; see also id. at 288. Although March believes that decision theorists have been
too quick to impose means-end rationality on such decision makers, it is not clear whether
his observations are appropriately applicable to judging. It is not clear, for example, that
judges should have the freedom that private managers may have to decide that symbols are
more important than implementation, or otherwise adopt nonrational or nonintentional
conceptions of decision making. In law, this reflects in part the formalist-functionalist de-
bate. After summarizing the social science debate, Jungermann commented, "The empha-
sis in [the criticisms of the rationality model] is less on demonstrating efficiency of human
behavior than on studying more carefully under what conditions people show which kind
of behavior." Jungermann, supra note 142, at 637.
147. Arthur A. Leff, Unspeakable Ethics, Unnatural Law, 1979 DuKE L.L 1229, 1249.
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ment. These have thus far consisted of improving the base of informa-
tion and the means of comparison.
The base of information made available to the decision maker
can be clarified, simplified, or expanded. 148 Although other ap-
proaches to decision making can be made to accept an expansion of
information, more open-ended forms of balancing invite those im-
provements. Additional information is not always a blessing. Infor-
mation without some guide to handling it can result in simple
overload, and lead to a complete breakdown of rational decision mak-
ing.149 Thus, it is not possible to claim that fully informed balancing is
always better or worse than alternatives. The crucial issue is a ques-
tion of technique: Do we have appropriate data and sufficient means
to handle it? The answer is driven by experience as well as by our
jurisprudential criteria. Forms of balancing prove satisfactory or un-
satisfactory area by area. We perceive either that the area is an un-
forgiving morass or that we are competent to deal with it.
This conclusion, that balancing is more or less appropriate on the
basis of apparent ability to handle the problems, is implicit in the fact
that the studies of decision making ground their results on the per-
ceived satisfaction with the decisions made and the implementation of
those decisions. Good decisions are those the subjects of the studies
discover they like. As noted above with appropriate caveats,150 sub-
jective evaluation of decision making fits more comfortably with utili-
tarianism than with other philosophical principles, but it may prove
implicit in very different approaches.
Another approach to improving the information base would be to
improve the relationship of either inputs or results to real-world
data.' 5' To say that values are present in a choice, more than merely
symbolically, implies that there is a link to such data. The value of a
decision is not clear without a reality check.
Beyond the information base, it may be possible to attack the
measurement problem, or means of comparison. There are ways ap-
ples and oranges can be compared. We could examine their nutrients,
for example, or their prices. The latter of course, partly reflects back
148. See JANIS & MANN, supra note 70, at 11, 171-200.
149. Id. at 17, 205, 425-26.
150. See supra Subpart D.1.
151. See Sanford Levinson, Identifying the Compelling State Interest: On "Due Process
of Lawmaking" and the Professional Responsibility of the Public Lawyer, 45 HASTINGS L.J.
1035, 1050-59 (1994) (arguing that the Attorney General has an obligation to improve the
relationship of either inputs or results to real world data); see also CARROLL & JOHNSON,
supra note 63, at 57-61, 63-66; Saks & Kidd, supra note 64, at 221-30, 232-42.
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to us our own fallible judgments. The former may rest on a humanis-
tic ethos we might want to defend though surely it also leaves out
issues of taste, color, and comfort. Judgment is ubiquitous and still
undefinable. Only parts of the paradox can be pushed aside in this
way. Still, in some domain for some range of issues, comparability is
possible, and it should similarly be possible to harmonize and translate
values described in the language of rights and the language of public
interests. 52
With respect to the rule of decision itself, constraints may be im-
posed in order to avoid predictable errors, much like the rules of evi-
dence have been designed to keep from the jury information it
seemed likely to misjudge. Burdens of proof and presumptions or
rules reflect judicial shortcuts to protect against particular types of er-
ror. Social scientists have equivalent devices available in both trun-
cated and optimization modes. For example, statistical degrees of
confidence are manipulated to prevent errors of omission or
commission.
For social scientists, modes of decision making will be chosen on
the basis of the time and resources available to resolve the issues, and
the costs associated with the method. Thus, shortcuts may be appro-
priate for less important decisions, optimization for more important
ones.
Although we might specify when it would be better if people opti-
mized fully rather than adopt some shortcut and vice versa, that deci-
sion will itself be based on an intuitive judgment in most instances
because the cost of conducting a full examination of which decision
process to use can be large. Nevertheless, some combination of fully
informed and more expedited forms of decision making will almost
certainly prove appropriate so that decisions are occasionally but not
constantly reviewed.
3. The Role of Judgment, Balancing, and Undefined Decision-Making
Processes
The analysis above leads to several conclusions:
152. Researchers and decision makers have also sometimes found it helpful to clarify
the implications of preferences by careful examination and organization in a "decision
tree" or "value tree." See Ward Edwards & J. Robert Newman, Multiattribute Evaluation,
in JUDGMENT AND DECISiON MAKiNc, supra note 64, at 13, 18, 37. This is not the appro-
priate place for a critical analysis of the appropriateness of using mathematical tools to
implement human preferences. In their General Introduction, the authors of Judgment
and Decision Making suggest a mathematical method which, whatever its other virtues and
problems, destroys many relevant comparisons by dividing by zero. Id. at 1-10.
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First, the opaque box has a role. An interpretive system without
an opaque box is imaginary. That is reflected in the fact that current
studies of decision making allocate a substantial role for the opaque
box.
Second, the debate over balancing needs to be recast more con-
textually. We can push the limits of competence back. Studies of de-
cision making do not support the claim for a single best technique.
There are techniques for minimal effort and there are techniques for
careful planning. The differences between rules and balances are mat-
ters of degree.
Third, the critique of balancing as optimization is in the failure to
process information properly. The critique of rules as decision short-
cuts is identical. The difference is not in the general accuracy or relia-
bility or precision of the method, but in the information omitted and
the occasions appropriate.
Fourth, interests have a role. There is no general rule that deci-
sions improve as considerations are swept under the rug. Instead, the
search is for ways to account for a richer tapestry of factors. Whether
articulated or unarticulated, whether optimized or satisficed, whether
used in the making of rules or in the application of principles, public
interests are part of the judicial decision-making process. No doubt
that is the way it should be. 153
Fifth, the legitimacy of interests does not depend on a precise ar-
ticulation of how they function in the balance. However the decision-
making process is constructed or described, the value of interests will
almost certainly be intuited. Precision is unavailable. Whether they
"weigh" more or less than the constitutional rights to which they are
opposed will be equally intuitive. But like the black box, they have a
role to play. That role is rarely avoidable. As the black box functions
despite the imprecision, interests have an impact on judgment despite
intuitive evaluation. That they should have a role is the subject of
Part IV.
IV. Translation of Values
This Article has been about missing links. The arguments about
balancing and rules have been arguments about what should be con-
sidered. As it turns out, interests occupy an inescapable logical place
in both systems. They have, however, been submerged by misconcep-
tions about the reasoning process and by neglect. Once they are stud-
153. See Stith, supra note 42.
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ied, a new set of inconsistencies becomes apparent. This Part is
designed to demonstrate the important relationship of rights and in-
terests as procedural terms for common values and the significance of
that relationship. 154
A. Disarray
Interests appear clearly communitarian. 155 But on a philosophi-
cal level, the barrier between the individual and the society is incoher-
ent within the Court's positivist jurisprudence. The state defines
individual meaning, consent and coercion, intention and motive-all
critical facets of what we take to be the individual side of that dichot-
omy. 56 In a positivist framework, with its skepticism about moral
claims, concepts, including public and private and individual and com-
munity, just are. There is no underlying reality or requirement. As a
result the state suffuses and therefore confuses the distinction be-
tween public and private. The individual-state dichotomy is the cen-
tral concept of the positivist notion of rights and interests but
positivism cannot explain it.
Given the failure of the public-private distinction generally, it is
not at all clear why we expect it to hold for interests and rights.' 57 In
154. In part, this is an effort to recover the realists' understanding of the relationships.
See Pound, Judicial Decision, supra note 9; Mendelson, supra note 109.
155. For a very interesting examination of the evolution of the communitarian side of
the republican tradition in law, see WILLIAM J. NOVAK, INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE
STATE POLICE POWER: THE COMMON LAW VISION OF A WELL-REGULATED SOCIETY
(University of Wisconsin Legal History Working Paper No. 3-2, 1989). Suzanna Sherry
provides an excellent review of the literature. See Suzanna Sherry, The Intellectual Origins
of the Constitution: A Lawyers' Guide to Contemporary Historical Scholarship, 5 CONST.
COMMENTARY 323 (1988). One of the seminal works is GORDON WOOD, THE CREATION
OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787 (1969).
156. See Clare Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of the Contract Doctrine, 94
YALE LJ. 997 (1985); Gottlieb, Compelling Governmental Interests, supra note 1; Hohfeld,
Fundamental Legal Conceptions, supra note 51; Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Con-
ceptions, supra note 51, at 36; Kainen, supra note 51, at 437-45; Peter Westen, "Freedom"
and "Coercion"--Virtue Words and Vice Words, 1985 DUKE L.J. 541.
157. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 363 n.5 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part):
I speak of the "government's side" only because it is the terminology used by the
Court. In my view, this terminology itself is seriously misleading. The govern-
ment is charged with protecting the privacy and security of the citizen, just as it is
charged with apprehending those who violate the criminal law. Consequently,
the government has no legitimate interest in conducting a search that unduly in-
trndes on the privacy and security of the citizen. The balance is not between the
rights of the government and the rights of the citizen, but between opposing con-
ceptions of the constitutionally legitimate means of carrying out the government's
varied responsibilities.
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fact the distinction has been under attack from both sides.' 58 Interests
if valid at all serve public welfare and the public of course is composed
of people, individuals.159 Rights similarly serve public goals. We all
have an "interest" in a fair and accurate criminal justice system-not
just the accused. 160 We all have an "interest" in free expression, not
just those censored.' 61
The disarray of state action doctrine reflects this problem. The
Supreme Court has tried and failed to make consistent use of stan-
dards for identification of state action that turn on whether the judici-
ary had to intervene, 162 whether the government was involved in the
enterprise, 163 or encouraged the behavior,164 and whether the type of
action was a traditional government function.' 65 It has exempted stat-
See also Aleinikoff, supra note 55, at 981; Coffin, supra note 55, at 28.
158. Compare T.L.O., 469 U.S. 363 n.5 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (arguing that the state has an interest in the protection of private rights) with
Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 145 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (complaining
that the state interest had been used to define private rights).
159. Gottlieb, Overriding Public Values, supra note 4, at 7.
160. Stith, supra note 42.
161. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE LJ. 1131,
1147 (1991); see also Pound, Survey, supra note 9, at 17.
162. Compare Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (holding that judicial enforcement
by state courts of covenants restricting occupancy of real property to whites violates Equal
Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment) with Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S.
163 (1972) (holding that state liquor licensing was insufficient state action to implicate
Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment).
163. Compare Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961) (holding that
state-created agency leasing property to restaurant owner binds restaurant owner with
Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment in case in which restaurant denied service
to black man) with Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974) (holding that
privately owned utility company's termination of service to household without hearing did
not constitute state action even though state regulated the utility and approved the general
tariff).
164. Compare Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967) (invalidating California consti-
tutional provision that allowed owner of real property absolute discretion to deny rental or
sale of property because it embodied a right to discriminate racially in state's basic charter)
with Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978) (upholding sale of private property to
satisfy lien pursuant to state UCC provision because that sale was private action). Flagg
has been severely limited by Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991)
(holding that peremptory challenges in federal district court that were illegally race-based
had their source in state action) and Lugar v. Edmundson Oil, 457 U.S. 922 (1982) (holding
that complainant states a cause of action when state authorized private creditors prejudg-
ment attachment is procedurally defective).
165. Cf Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976) (upholding right of privately owned
shopping center agent to deny striking union members access to picket the center); Lloyd
Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972) (denying draft and war protesters the right to handbill
in shopping center because the shopping center was not so open to public use to permit
handbilling unrelated to the center's operations); Amalgamated Food Employees Union
Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308 (1968) (holding that state cannot forbid
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utory or executive behavior or both when decisions seemed private 66
and has made the state responsible for individual behavior that
seemed public. 67 No line divides the public and private spheres.168
In other words, the entire balancing act has been organized
around a false division that was weighted not only against "individual
rights" but also against social needs. Interests have been cut off from
the underlying values and turned into a menace by the truncated read-
ing they have been given. And rights have been cut off from their
purposes as well, thus seeming smaller and more selfish in the
process. 169
In "legal" terms, the translation of rights and interests into a com-
mon language removes the barrier between them and entails the nour-
ishment of rights by interests. Once the common individual and social
roles of rights and interests are perceived, both are reshaped: Inter-
ests must account for individuals, and rights must account for society.
That strengthens the humanitarian cast of both. The path is opened
toward the common goal of a more decent place for all-that goal
surely includes rights.
The ultimate purpose of exploring public interests is to use what
have been deployed as antihumanistic weapons against themselves. 70
That object is explored in the remainder of this Article.
B. So What?
Does the deconstruction of the public-private distinction and the
cross-referencing of rights and interests matter? Of course it does.
First, it uncovers the purpose of doctrine, which inevitably expands its
union from picketing public area fronting shopping center because of First Amendment
infringement); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (treating actions of company owned
town as government action).
166. Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978); Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison
Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
167. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365
U.S. 715 (1961); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
168. See Paul Brest, State Action and Liberal Theory: A Casenote on Flagg Brothers v.
Brooks, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1296 (1982); see generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CoNsTrrTUToNAL LAW 1688-1720 (2d ed. 1988); Symposium on the State Action Doctrine,
10 CONST. COMMENTARY 309-41 (1993). The more useful question, as this work has made
clear, is which activities require collective accountability.
169. Kahn has noted, "The denial of a distinction between rights and interests is an
essential point in the realist tradition." Kahn, supra note 52, at 7 n.27.
170. See Gottlieb, Overriding Public Values, supra note 4, at 8-19, 136.
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scope.' 7 1 Instead of narrow claims to an interest in chasing criminals,
we confront a broader basis in the protection of life, liberty, and prop-
erty. Instead of a claim that such an interest can only be asserted by
the state, we confront a redefinition that narrows interests in accord
with those purposes. Rights are part of the world that interests pro-
tect. There is no interest in riding roughshod over civil justice.
Interests help to clarify and simplify other constitutional catego-
ries by allowing us to disaggregate them and deal directly with the
values at stake rather than with derivative concepts that mask the is-
sues. For example, unconstitutional conditions have been a problem
because the Court has tied it to the categories of consent and coercion
that do not make sense.' 72 We end up defining consent and coercion
by what burdens people should have to endure. 173 We could more
simply and more appropriately define conditions as unconstitutional
when they are unjustified174-thus getting to the significant constitu-
tional issues rather than being taken on the consensual tangent.175
Similarly, state action has been a problem because the categories
of public and private do not make sense-indeed, they are hard to
distinguish. 76 We have not found a simple way of defining either, and
can hardly expect to because of the many conflicting circumstances
that make private actions public and public actions private. We could
simplify and structure this field, by defining state action as govern-
ment behavior that is not required by a state obligation to allow indi-
vidual liberty, or that is not authorized by an important public interest
in allowing individual liberty. In other words, when the state acts to
protect the liberties of individuals, those individuals are responsible
for whatever harms they may cause and the state is not responsible for
those harms. But if the individual cannot claim a liberty that the state
was bound or permitted to respect, the state is responsible for its part
in making the harm possible. Plainly the holding of Shelley v. Krae-
mer 77 was that the state was neither required nor permitted to grant
private landowners the power to exclude a race from property owner-
171. Cf. Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571, 582-88 (1987) (discussing
the implications of the incorporation of theory in language as a means of communication
between lawmakers and interpreters).
172. See Sullivan, supra note 97; Westen, supra note 156, at 569-93.
173. See Westen, supra note 156.
174. The issue of justification requires that one identify a controlling moral theory. As
I have argued above, that task is unavoidable, but it is beyond the scope of this Article.
175. See Sullivan, supra note 97.
176. See supra notes 162-168.
177. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
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ship. It was a substantive holding, not a holding about whether the
state or the signers of the restrictive covenant caused the harm.
State interests are the wedge that could allow us to glimpse and
deal with the substantive issues that are rumbling beneath these un-
ruly concepts. The state action concept is clarified by interests be-
cause the question becomes whether the values-expressed as they
have been as interests and rights-require or forbid particular official
behavior. Interests deconstruct the sterile concept of state action into
the question of state obligation-the whole point of constitutional in-
junctions in the first place.
Instead of claims of right isolated from public purposes, the
claims of right gain strength from those public purposes. As they
share common purposes, the deposit of interests strengthens the foun-
dations of rights-education, shelter, and life itself.
In other words, the communitarian power of interests coupled
with the failure of the public-private distinction means that what has
been established on the government side of the ledger as interests,
should be available on the individual side of the ledger as rights, to
protect people from public overreaching.
That puts the Court in a different light. When the Court's deci-
sions on education, equality, privacy, shelter, and life are viewed in
this broader context, the partisanship of its vision is exposed.178 The
interpretive issues that have dominated discussion for so long cannot
explain the disparity in treatment of rights and interests. Interests are
equally nontextual. But on opposite sides of that linguistic divide of
rights and interests, the Burger-Rehnquist Court has treated
equivalent values as dominant on one side and subordinate on the
other. Thus, it is the Burger-Rehnquist Court that picks and chooses
its beneficiaries nontextually and ideologically. We are left not with
the value of public education but its value for some, not the right to
life but the right to life only for the unborn, etc.
Consider Herrera again. Although Chief Justice Rehnquist of-
fered a distinction between Herrera and other habeas cases in which
the conservative block wrote about an actual innocence exception,
concern about innocence has resonated in other decisions as well.
Consider, for example, Justice Scalia's language in County of Riverside
v. McLaughlin:17.9
178. See also Gottlieb, Overriding Public Values, supra note 4, at 8-9, 19.
179. 500 U.S. 44 (1991).
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One hears the complaint, nowadays, that the Fourth Amendment
has become constitutional law for the guilty; that it benefits the ca-
reer criminal (through the exclusionary rule) often and directly, but
the ordinary citizen remotely if at all. ... The common-law rule of
prompt hearing had as its primary beneficiaries the innocent-not
those whose fully justified convictions must be overturned to scold
the police .... Hereafter a law-abiding citizen wrongfully arrested
may be compelled to await the grace of a Dickensian bureaucratic
machine, as it churns its cycle for up to two days-never once given
the opportunity to show a judge that there is absolutely no reason to
hold him, that a mistake has been made. In my view, this is the
image of a system of justice that has lost is ancient sense of priority,
a system that few Americans would recognize as our own.180
Taken together, the decisions exhibiting a concern for innocence sug-
gested that the conservative block had little use for purely procedural
requirements on behalf of patently guilty petitioners. Instead they
suggested that the real issue that concerned them was substantive jus-
tice, both as a right, at least for Scalia in McLaughlin, and as an inter-
est in the cases restricting the writ of habeas corpus. Those concerns
of course should have carried over to Herrera. Instead the Court now
says that rules, not justice, dominate. The inconsistency tells us that
the block means neither. The only basis on which their opinions can
be reconciled is a version of the adversary system played by the rules
of Russian roulette-a game with losers.
Conclusion
Interests are permanent features of the constitutional landscape.
But by treating them as illegitimate, we have turned them into out-
laws, pillaging and rampaging through constitutional civilization.
Their misbehavior is unnecessary. The inconsistent treatment of inter-
ests and rights is not appropriate under any commonly used interpre-
tive canons. The reflection of public values only in derogation of
personal liberty is uncalled for by the Constitution. And the Court
should be called to account for partiality that has no support in the
text, history, or fundamental principles of constitutional law.
180. Id. at 71 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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